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Executive Summary1
Design of matching systems between refugees and states or local areas is 
emerging as one of the most promising solutions to problems in refugee 
resettlement. We describe the basics of two-sided matching theory used in 
a number of allocation problems, such as school choice, where both sides 
need to agree to the match. We then explain how these insights can be 
applied to international refugee matching in the context of the European 
Union and examine how refugee matching might work within the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.
1. Introduction
Refugee resettlement is difficult. It is a complex administrative task, often conducted with 
inadequate funding and staffing, and, by necessity, often hurriedly. It frequently requires 
coordination across multiple agencies — public and private — operating on different sides 
of the globe. 
Public attention and activism often focuses on the question of “how many?” In the context 
of incredibly limited supply of resettlement spaces, this is not unreasonable. The proportion 
of refugees in situations of “protracted displacement” (where more than 25,000 refugees 
have been in exile for more than five years) was estimated at two-thirds in 2009 (Loescher, 
Gil, and Milner 2009), prior to the current Syrian crisis. For refugees in protracted 
situations, the average length of stay is 17 years. There are now some 21.3 million refugees 
in the world, out of some 65.3 million forcibly displaced worldwide (UNHCR 2016a). In 
this context, global resettlement capacity is awesomely, ludicrously inadequate: in 2015, 
states admitted 107,100 refugees for resettlement, of which the United States accepted 
more than half (66,500) (UNHCR 2016b, 3). As one recent group of refugee experts 
uncompromisingly put it, “the current global system for refugee protection is broken” 
(Dauvergne and Hathaway 2016).
However, as with any scarce resource, it is also vital to consider how the limited resettlement 
capacity of the states can be used most effectively. In this paper, we focus on the question 
that arises after it has been decided that a given group of refugees will be resettled. Instead 
1   We are grateful to Alex Betts and especially to the participants of the Center of Migration Studies 
Rethinking the Global Refugee Protection System Conference (New York, July 2016) and the HCEO Market 
Design Perspectives on Inequality Conference (Chicago, August 2016) for their comments and suggestions.
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of “how many?” we consider “who goes where, and how should it be decided?” Importantly, 
none of the methods discussed in this paper should ever be used to determine which refugees 
get resettled, only to determine where those who are being resettled could be best placed. 
Currently, national resettlement agencies or the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) conduct assessments in refugee camps and elsewhere to identify 
those most in need of resettlement, usually on the basis of vulnerability. Nothing in this 
paper suggests any change to that system. But after it has been determined that a refugee 
or refugee family is being resettled to a particular state, there is the need to decide the 
particular regional in which the refugee will be resettled.  
This process is often committed, well-informed, and animated by a genuine desire to make 
the process work best for the refugees. However, it remains “bespoke”: refugee resettlement 
officers are manually attempting to collate and process vast amounts of information. 
Refugees are sometimes asked if they possess any particular preferences over where they 
might want to go, but their preferences are not comprehensively sought out and acted on in 
a systematic manner. In such processes, the preferences of refugees are in general inferred, 
rather than directly collected, which runs the risk that agencies make incorrect assumptions 
about what refugees want (for example, we often assume people wish to be near their 
extended family networks, but in some instances this could not be further from the case). 
Further, resettlement agencies constantly face trade-offs — for example, a given refugee 
has skills which suggests one area, but ensuring proximity to her co-linguists suggests 
another — but lack information as to how to prioritize the various factors. When such trade-
offs arise between conflicting priorities, there is currently no transparent attempt to resolve 
the trade-offs, except by assuming in advance that a given dimension of priority (health or 
employability) is the most important one. In no systems that we have encountered in our 
research are refugees themselves asked directly how they would wish that trade-off to be 
made.
There is ample evidence, however, that placing refugees in the best areas for them has 
profound consequences for their long-term flourishing. Backing out of resettlement or 
simply outright refusal to participate in the process is more common than is generally 
thought: refugees may be understandably reluctant to embark on another long journey to 
a destination about which they know little, particularly if leaving the immediate region in 
which they have sought asylum involves losing contact with communities and economic 
networks which they have been relying on. Most extremely, when resettlement places 
refugees in areas where they do not want to go, they make the appalling choice to return, 
as when thousands of Iraqi refugees who arrived in Finland last year decided to cancel 
their asylum applications and to return home “voluntarily” (Forsell 2016). This is still 
comparatively rare: it is more common that refugees are placed and remain living in areas 
that lack the resources they need to embark on flourishing lives. For example, in the early 
1990s Sweden deliberately placed refugees randomly around the country, hoping they would 
integrate better. The research done by Olof Åslund at Uppsala University based on this 
petri-dish human experiment has shown conclusively that the initial placement of refugees 
into less prosperous communities lowered their job prospects, health, income levels, and 
education (Åslund 2005; Åslund and Rooth 2007; Åslund and Fredriksson 2009; Åslund, 
Östh, and Zenou 2010; Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund 2004). More recent evidence from 
the current refugee crisis in Germany suggests that refugees do not naturally gravitate 
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towards areas with more jobs and housing, but instead prioritize living close to their co-
ethnics (Economist 2016). Getting resettlement right, therefore, requires paying attention 
to who goes where. Although this proposal is not designed to increase participation in 
resettlement directly, getting it right may make states, voluntary agencies, and communities 
more willing to participate in resettlement in the long run, thereby raising capacity.
In this paper, we suggest a friendly amendment to the status quo based on a rich literature 
in economics on “market design.” What we propose is a matching system — the refugee 
match — that can be used to match refugees to countries, to local areas, to agencies, or to 
different forms of protection status. This system uses no money or trading, better respects 
the freedom and choices of refugees, and serves the core interests of the states, agencies, 
and communities participating in resettlement.
First, we consider the basics of “matching theory”: how it works, and what it can do (Section 
2). Then, we consider two possible uses of matching systems for refugee resettlement, 
internationally (Section 3) and locally (Section 4). An international refugee match would 
involve a hypothetical burden-sharing system between some set of states (e.g., the European 
Union) which wished to adopt a joint resettlement scheme (Jones and Teytelboym 2017a; 
Moraga and Rapoport 2014; 2015a; 2015b) A local refugee match would consider how 
refugees are allocated across localities within one jurisdiction (Jones and Teytelboym 
2017b; Delacrétaz, Kominers, and Teytelboym 2016). Local refugee matching systems 
look rather different depending on the institutional context of a given country. Therefore, 
we consider what matching might look like, and what benefits it could provide, in three 
different contexts: the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Canada. 
2. Matching in Theory and in Practice
Two-sided matching theory is a mathematical framework for allocating resources where 
both parties to the transaction need to agree to the match in order for a match to take place. 
A running analogy throughout this paper is going to be with the match between children and 
schools. In many school districts (in many large American cities and across several European 
countries, including the United Kingdom), parents are allowed to express preferences over 
schools they wish to send their children to. They submit a ranking reflecting that they 
prefer the Rydell to Bronson Alcott to Sunnydale High and so on. Schools, on the other 
hand, have fixed (non-manipulable) priorities regarding children: for example, they would 
prioritize children who have siblings in the same school and live in the neighbourhood over 
children who only have a sibling or only live in the neighbourhood. Importantly, schools 
know in advance that they are going to get some fixed number of students, so they have 
only incentives to be as attractive as possible. Parents’ and children’s preferences clearly 
matter — the government would have no way of reliably figuring out which of the tens of 
thousands of children would fare best at what kind of school. This is the sort of information 
that only parents and their children have and one of the roles of a designed matching 
system is to aggregate this information similarly to how a competitive market does (Hayek 
1945). A centralized application process is also important: it would be unfair if children 
missed out on a place in an appropriate school only because their parents did not spend the 
night before application day outside the school doors. 
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What makes a good school choice matching system? Economists have identified three key 
potentially desirable characteristics of a successful and fair allocation system, all of which 
cannot exist in a single system and thus must be prioritized:
• Stability — no student should miss out on a place in a school she prefers because a 
student with a lower priority has taken it. This is known as the “elimination of justifiable 
envy” in economics, because it means schools and students do not end up dissatisfied 
with their match and seeking to “re-match” under the table, thus leading the whole 
system to unravel.
• Efficiency — no student should be able to get a place in a more preferred school without 
another student’s ending up in a school he prefers less. Put simply, there is no potential 
“swap” of any two students that would make anyone happier without making someone 
else unhappier.
• Strategy-proofness (for students) — no student should have an incentive to lie about 
their preferences over schools in the hope of getting a place in a more preferred school: 
it is logically impossible to “game” the system. 
In the past decade and a half, economists have closely studied how school choice systems 
work (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003; Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth 2005). 
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez showed the allocation procedure used in the past by the 
Boston public school authorities was not strategy-proof and therefore unlikely to have 
been efficient. This meant that after the allocation happened, parents sought to rematch 
their children to different schools. Moreover, parents were actively gaming the system. 
The economists offered two alternative strategy-proof matching systems: one was stable 
and the other was efficient.2 Unfortunately, the school district had to make a choice as it has 
been mathematically proven that no matching system can be stable, efficient, and strategy-
proof: there is no perfect system (Roth 1982). As such, school districts must prioritize: in 
the end New York and Boston picked the former and New Orleans (for a while) and San 
Francisco opted for the latter.
School choice is just one of many settings that matching theorists have studied. Other two-
sided matching systems include the allocation of residents to hospitals (Roth 1984) and 
cadets to army branches (Sönmez and Switzer 2013). We argue that insights from matching 
theory can play a crucial part in the global refugee resettlement process.
Matching Theory in the Context of Refugee Resettlement
We now describe two types of two-sided matching systems for refugee resettlement. On 
the one side of the matching system are the refugees. We assume that families that do not 
wish to be split apart should not be.  Therefore, the relevant unit of analysis is a refugee 
family. Moreover, we take as given the determination of refugee status and the decision to 
offer resettlement to a given family. On the other side are countries (Section 3) or localities 
(Section 4) that have stated their capacities to accept refugee placements in advance. The 
2   For those interested in reading further, these are algorithms known as the Gale-Shapley and Top Trading 
Cycles.
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matching system only comes into effect after we know that a given population of refugees 
is to be resettled to a given set of placements. In this model, all refugees in the system 
would know that they were going somewhere, and all receiving countries and localities 
would know that they were receiving some fixed number of refugees.
The three potentially desirable properties of a matching system in the context of refugee 
resettlement would look like this: 
• Stability — no refugee family should miss out on a resettlement place in a country/
locality it prefers because a refugee family with a lower priority has taken it.
• Efficiency — no refugee family should be able to get a resettlement place in a more 
preferred country/locality without another refugee family’s ending up in a country/
locality it prefers less.
• Strategy-proofness (for families) — no country/locality should have an incentive to lie 
about its preferences over countries/localities in the hope of getting a resettlement place 
in a more preferred country/locality. 
In the rest of this paper, we use “stability” and “efficiency” in these narrower technical 
senses rather than their vernacular meanings. Of course, there might be other properties that 
are equally important, such as maximizing the total number of refugees or refugee families 
that are resettled (Andersson and Ehlers 2016; Delacrétaz, Kominers, and Teytelboym 
2016). As we pointed out above, there are trade-offs in satisfying these properties and 
therefore implementing one algorithm over another will depend on the particular context.
3. International Refugee Match: The Case of the European 
Union
Resettlement still constitutes only a tiny fraction of the solution to the global refugee crisis: 
only one percent of all refugees get resettled annually. As such, it is an exceptionally scare 
resource that is worth using as efficiently as is humanly possible. It is also worth recognizing 
that international refugee resettlement is already a two-sided matching system (Jones and 
Teytelboym 2017a). In order for a refugee family to be resettled, it must avail itself of 
the protection of the particular country that offers the family asylum. In fact, UNHCR 
already often acts as a matchmaker similar to the public school board by processing 
applications and suggesting refugees for resettlement in countries that have agreed to 
take the refugees. The current matching process, however, does not happen in a manner 
that has been systematically designed to achieve properties like stability, efficiency, and 
strategy-proofness. When UNHCR acts as a conduit for the vast majority of resettlement 
applications, it does not take into account the preferences of refugees and the priorities of 
countries in any systematic way. UNHCR typically suggests a family for resettlement in a 
particular country and the country processes the application it receives.  
In most general terms, a centralized international matching system for refugees would 
allow refugees to apply for protection in several countries and allow countries to compete 
to protect different refugees. In one potential system, refugees could make one claim for 
asylum to a single centralized body, simultaneously specifying where, if successful, they 
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would wish to be relocated. A different system would be one where states have identified 
in advance a population to be resettled (either through a group determination of status, 
or some other special dispensation). The system would then match refugees to countries. 
States come to the clearinghouse with a quota of refugees they are willing to accept (we 
discuss minimum and maximum quotas in the next section) and a ranking of the priorities 
they are seeking in refugees. The countries and refugees are then matched. 
A European refugee match would require a group of states to coordinate minimally with 
each other insofar as they would have to opt into the Refugee Match, but it need not force 
states to abandon any of their current agendas, be they liberal, or restrictive (for example, 
whether it is compatible with minimum or maximum refugee quotas, or neither). This is 
necessary, because although the European Union has been working towards a Common 
European Asylum System since 1999, including a stated commitment to the harmonization 
of resettlement, there is still substantial heterogeneity in the priorities of EU states over the 
refugees they are seeking to resettle. While, for example, France and the United Kingdom 
prioritize family ties, Romania puts emphasis on concerns about threats to public security 
(see Figure 1). Hence, a part of any solution must take into consideration these remaining 
different priorities among states.
Figure 1. Source: EASO Fact Finding Report on Intra-EU 
Activities in Malta 
Source: EASO (2012).
Refugees themselves must have very different preferences, but it is virtually impossible 
to know what they are from the available data. Much of the European public discourse 
assumes that refugees would be grateful to be resettled anywhere in Europe. But in 
February 2016, for example, hundreds of Iraqi refugees who were resettled in Finland 
asked to be sent home (Forsell 2016). To some extent, survey statistics mislead about how 
many refugees arriving in Europe genuinely prefer to go to Germany rather than, say, the 
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United Kingdom (IOM 2016). Of course, thousands of Syrian refugees set out for Germany 
precisely because Germany, unlike most other European countries, had virtually guaranteed 
them asylum there. It is not at all clear whether refugees would have so overwhelmingly 
preferred Germany other things being equal. And yet even imperfect anecdotal data suggest 
that there is a substantial degree of variation in the preferred destination countries between, 
say, Syrians and Eritreans.3 Currently, refugees overwhelmingly prioritize safety and ease 
of route and the likelihood of being granted status somewhere. In consequence, we know 
almost nothing about the full preferences of refugees once those considerations are taken 
out of the equation. Getting the match right would therefore considerably improve the 
welfare of refugees and ease the burden on the states. 
A refugee matching system, therefore, has the following benefits. First and most obviously, 
rather than being directed by the internal procedures of bureaucracies, it can give refugees 
more choice than they currently possess about where they are resettled. Second, a matching 
system can make the process less arbitrary and contingent on ad-hoc bilateral deals by states, 
and dangerous journeys and lottery-like decisions to make journeys by refugees. Third, 
because the computer algorithm finds the matching outcome as soon as the preferences of 
both sides are submitted, the matching system can speed up resettlement. Fourth, because 
matching enables states to effectively share burdens whilst also empowering them to 
receive refugees that match their preferences, this mechanism may encourage more states 
to participate in resettlement.
There are numerous details that would need to be decided in order to implement such a 
system. We comment in detail on them in another paper (Jones and Teytelboym 2017a). 
There are also difficulties with implementing such a scheme. First, many EU countries are 
likely to require financial or other incentives to participate (Moraga and Rapoport 2014; 
2015a; 2015b). It is worth noting, in passing, that if this can be overcome, matching produces 
a further advantage: if states know they are accepting some fixed number of refugees, 
and know that the choices of refugees will determine which refugees they receive, they 
would then have every incentive to be as attractive to refugees as possible. Second, even 
though this improved refugee match is likely to reduce secondary migration, it is unlikely 
to eliminate it entirely. Therefore, it is unclear how the stability desideratum can be easily 
maintained. Third, EU countries would need to surrender some administrative tasks of 
refugee status determination to a central authority. While that does not mean that refugee 
status determination or priorities themselves need to be entirely harmonized, EU countries 
might need to entrust the application of their rules and procedures to a central EU body.
Ultimately, however, a well-run international matching system delivers a sense of control 
for the states, value for money for the public purse, and has huge welfare benefits for 
refugees. This is precisely what might encourage EU states to eventually increase their 
quotas.
4. Local Refugee Match
Once a refugee family is given asylum in a particular country, there is still a question 
of where exactly they end up living within that country. This process tends to be highly 
3   Author interviews, 2016.
Matching Systems for Refugees
673
centralized in many countries, but it is also one that almost entirely ignores both the 
preferences of refugees and the priorities of local areas. Indeed, Sweden experimented with 
random allocation of refugees in the 1990s. While the policy was eventually scrapped, it 
allowed researchers to study the causal effects of allocation to particular localities. The key 
finding was that refugees in general who are initially matched to less prosperous localities 
fared considerably worse over their lifetime (in terms of employment and education) than 
refugees who ended up in more affluent areas. It is very unlikely that this result would not 
extend to other countries (though to our knowledge no other country except Denmark has 
experimented with an explicitly random policy). However, in contexts where resettlement 
capacity is likely to continue to involve a mix of more and less affluent areas, it is important 
to make sure that refugees are placed as effectively as possible: not all areas will have 
the same bundle of public services, the same employment gaps, the same religious or 
community-based goods, and so there are potential “wins for free” in making sure that 
refugees are placed in the areas which best serve their particular needs. 
Localities would not rank refugees individually both for logistical and ethical reasons. To do 
so might enable unscrupulous localities, for example, to use names as proxies for unethical 
criteria (e.g., second names which identify the refugee’s faith or ethnicity). Instead, they 
would have “priority categories” corresponding to their provision capacities, which they 
would rank. The full ranking of priority categories is the “priority structure” of a particular 
locality. The provision capacities of localities are more diverse than is usually thought: for 
example, some hospitals specialize in providing for particular conditions. In a locality with 
a hospital treating unusual medical conditions (e.g., tropical medicine), the highest priority 
might be for refugees who have those conditions. Other priority categories might include 
the suitability of accommodation, particular care services, the availability of particular 
forms of in-kind welfare, educational opportunities (e.g., spaces in schools), employment 
opportunities, the presence of particular civil society groups in a position to play support 
roles in refugee reception, and other integration services. Like the case of schools, higher 
priority will be given to refugees who satisfy several categories (e.g., those with a rare 
medical condition and family in the area will be prioritized over those who have either a 
rare medical condition or family). 
The central state decides what the priority categories could be, but localities themselves 
could control their ranking of those categories. Deciding what categories it is permissible 
to rank on is important in order to prevent localities from attempting to prioritize refugees 
in morally repugnant ways (e.g., were a locality to try and take only white refugees). One 
possible way to do this would be to make the possible priority categories correspond to 
the categories of vulnerability and particular need already collected by UNHCR and other 
resettlement agencies.
We now proceed to describe how best to match refugee to localities in three different 
countries. Each of these states allow refugees to migrate internally without restriction; offer 
considerable support to refugees in the early stages of resettlement; and have considerable 
control of the number of arrivals due to their geographical location, thereby allowing them 
to determine the optimal size and frequency of resettlement batches. Yet their particular 
institutional arrangements also offer interesting contrasts and comparisons in how the 
matching systems could be run. Moreover, as Delacrétaz, Kominers, and Teytelboym 
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(2016) point out, the local refugee match is a more complicated matching problem than the 
international refugee match because of the complex constraints on the public services that 
are required by refugee families.
United Kingdom
The simplest context for a local refugee match would be when refugees are relocated via a 
single scheme, operated by the central state. This is the case for the British government’s 
Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement (SVRP) program, extended by former Prime 
Minister David Cameron on September 7th 2015. By 2020, the SVRP program aims to 
resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees in families, alongside a further 3,000 unaccompanied 
minors from conflict situations4 in the Middle East and North Africa, and an unspecified 
number of unaccompanied refugee children currently in Europe. The program is managed 
by a joint unit between the Home Office and the departments for International Development 
and Communities and Local Government. The resettled refugees are given five years’ 
humanitarian protection status, with permission to work and access public funds (paving 
a path to citizenship). As of March 2016, 1,602 people had been resettled in the United 
Kingdom under the scheme (Gower and Politowski 2016). 
Under the SVRP program, refugees are matched to a local authority (which undertakes 
responsibility for that family for the duration of the visa), as well as to a specific house. 
Crucially, the participation of local authorities is entirely voluntary. Therefore, local 
authorities need incentives to participate in this program. This also means that the UK 
government is keen to prevent secondary movement of refugees from their initial 
placements, making it particularly important that refugees are matched successfully in the 
first instance.
In this program, most of the costs associated with refugees in the short-term are borne by 
the central state (e.g., benefits are paid directly by the Department of Work and Pensions), 
and the government has also undertaken to support local authorities with the additional 
costs they will bear. The costs have been estimated to range from £8,500 (adults and 
children under three) to £14,000 (school-age children) (Dedman 2015). The £460 million 
committed by the government is intended to meet these costs in full for the first year. This 
funding supplements housing support and educational funding, which are separately funded. 
However, the subsequent costs of refugee resettlement are borne by local authorities5 or 
through a recently announced Full Community Sponsorship program (UK Home Office 
2016).
There are non-trivial implementation issues for the British matching system. First, there 
are over 350 local authorities and the Home Office cannot possibly expect refugees to rank 
any or all of these localities without adequate information. One way to circumvent this is 
4   The current British Prime Minister, Theresa May, currently appears to have rowed back on this commitment.
5   In another paper, we describe how heterogeneous financial incentives can be used to encourage more local 
authorities to participate (Jones and Teytelboym 2017b). Specifically, payments which scale according to 
the number of refugees hosted in an area will create very different patterns of resettlement based on whether 
the function determining how the total payment changes with the number of refugees hosted is concave or 
convex.
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to elicit preferences over the types of local areas that refugees prefer (e.g., whether living 
in an urban area is more important than living near a place of worship). Second, refugees 
are being matched to housing procured on the private rental market, which can be volatile 
and unpredictable on a local level. Ensuring an adequate and reliable supply of housing is 
a crucial part of designing a well-functioning system. 
Canada
Canada is one of the largest, regular destinations of refugee resettlement in the world. In 
2014, for example, it resettled 7,233 refugees, which is around 10 percent of the UNHCR 
total. In November 2015, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canada would 
resettle an additional 25,000 Syrian refugees and by late February 2016, this target was 
reached. Canada plans to resettle an additional 35,000 to 50,000 refugees by the end of 
2016 alone.
There are three types of refugee resettlement schemes in Canada:
• Government assistance (GA) program — the government resettles refugees referred by 
the UNHCR.
• Private sponsorship program — private individuals or organizations can support 
resettlement of specific refugees.
• Blended Visa Office-Referred (BVOR) program — the government and private 
organizations share the costs of resettling refugees referred by the UNHCR.
The Canadian welfare system operates very similarly to the British system although the 
total share of government expenditures is closer to that of the United States at around 42 
percent of GDP. The government (Ottawa or Quebec) covers the resettlement costs for up 
to one year in the GA program or six months in the BVOR program (the private sponsors 
cover the other six months). Healthcare is mostly free at the point of use and there is 
considerable government support for the unemployed, alongside other forms of welfare.
Matching systems could play a great role in government assistance and in blended program. 
In the private sponsorship scheme, the private organizations already have the ability to 
name particular refugees so there is no scope for matching with preferences.6 Since refugees 
could in principle express a preference over whether they enter the resettlement process via 
the GA or the BVOR programs, we can describe this matching problem as one of matching 
with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005; Sönmez and Switzer 2013). Hence, a refugee 
family might reasonably prefer to be resettled in Toronto by the Lutheran Church to being 
resettled in Vancouver by the government. The Canadian federal system lends itself to 
an expression of preferences among Canadian states in addition to the types of areas the 
refugees might prefer. Indeed, there are only 10 provinces (and three territories to which 
resettlement is unlikely) so it is possible to provide refugees with enough information 
that they are able to indicate a reasonable preference list. On the locality level, the overall 
service capacity would be jointly determined by the provision of the local governments 
6   Private sponsorship schemes could, however, gain insights from optimizing the Pennsylvania Adoption 
Exchange (Slaugh et al. 2016).
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and by the private organizations. Provinces would be able to coordinate the relevant 
information (including priorities) from individual localities and private organizations and 
encourage other localities to participate with extra funding. This makes it easier for the 
central government to negotiate province-level resettlement numbers that would act as 
total provincial quotas in the system (Kamada and Kojima 2015).
United States
The United States is, by a distance, the most generous participant in global resettlement. 
Since 1975, over three million refugees have been welcomed to the United States. The 
Department of State is the coordinating government body, and resettlement is funded by the 
Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (the “Bureau”). The number 
of persons that may be admitted as refugees each year is established by the president in 
consultation with Congress. This “Refugee Admission Ceiling” is then divided into five 
global regions, alongside an unallocated reserve for unforeseen emergencies. Refugees are 
expected to apply for permanent residency (a green card) one year after being admitted to 
the United States, and may apply for US citizenship five years after admission as a refugee.7
Figure 2. US Annual Refugee Admission Ceilings, Fiscal 
Year 1980-2016
Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, “Proposed Refugee 
Admissions for Fiscal Year,” various years, with graph from Zong and Batalova (2015).
7   For a fuller account of the US refugee resettlement system and actual refugee admissions by year, see 
Kerwin (2015).
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However, the Bureau’s role in the operation of resettlement is, in contrast to the British 
system, extremely limited. Instead, the Department of State works with nine private 
voluntary agencies (or “Volags”). These agencies sign cooperative agreements with the 
Department of State to provide reception and placement services to all refugees arriving in 
the United States. The current list of Volags includes:
• Church World Service
• Episcopal Migration Ministries
• Ethiopian Community Development Council
• Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
• International Rescue Committee
• Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
• US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
• United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
• World Relief
These agencies meet weekly to review a batch of refugees based on biographical information 
sent to them by the Resettlement Support Centers (the overseas offices which identify 
refugees for resettlement). During this weekly meeting, decisions are made as to which 
agency will take responsibility for which refugees. Volags take turns every week in their 
priority to pick the cases that they want to take on. Then, the agencies themselves decide 
where to place refugees across some 190 communities throughout the United States. As 
such, in the US context, there is a two-stage match: allocating refugees to Volags, and then 
to local communities.
The American system is extremely well-institutionalized and can tap into a vast well of 
expertise and a huge network of supportive actors because it is embedded in (largely 
religious) community networks. However, the system also expects refugees to rapidly 
transition to self-reliance (within about six months) and operates in a context with a minimal 
welfare safety net. After that point, support and services are largely coordinated by the 
federal Health and Human Services’s Office of Refugee Resettlement, which similarly will 
have a complex and uneven national map of provision capacities. For these reasons, the 
priority in the match is likely to be designing a system which maximizes the likelihood 
that refugees can integrate, join the labor market, and cease to need extensive support as 
soon as possible. Furthermore, the sheer scale of resettlement in the United States makes 
preference-free matching particularly likely to miss important information.
As in the British case, it is unlikely that refugees will have adequate information to process 
and rank localities directly. Therefore, it is also likely here that the best system would 
encourage refugees to express preference over types rather than specific named areas. As in 
the Canadian case, refugees could have preferences over not only where they are resettled 
but also which Volag they are resettled by, opening another application of matching with 
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contracts. Refugees could be asked to rank their most preferred states (as in the Canadian 
refugee match) as well as properties of areas within these states (as in the British refugee 
match) alongside preferences over Volags. That process would greatly simplify the weekly 
allocation task for the Volags themselves. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that matching must be an important part of any durable and 
comprehensive response to the global refugee crisis. We have shown that centralized 
matching in which the preferences of refugees and the priorities of states (international) 
or of localities (local) are elicited directly can be used in a variety of contexts to make the 
resettlement process more fair, efficient, and humane. The next step would be to understand 
empirically the effect of matching with preferences on the lifetime outcomes of refugees 
and development of community relations.
While we are confident that major host countries for refugee resettlement will eventually 
adopt comprehensive matching systems for resettlement, there is a greater need for 
matching systems in places where most refugees currently are — the developing world. 
Designing and implementing matching systems in countries with weak institutions pose a 
substantial challenge to researchers and policymakers. However, this challenge must be the 
most fruitful area for further research.
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